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LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE INTERNAL

ASPECT OF RULES
Benjamin C. Zipursky*
INTRODUCTION

Some philosophers approach their project of philosophizing with
aspirations to edify, to bring about social change, or to construct a grand
theoretical synthesis. H.L.A. Hart's aspirations, on first blush, were more
modest. Like many of his British predecessors and contemporaries, he
aimed to preserve common sense.
Hart believed that there was a
commonsensical approach to the law exemplified by citizens in a modem
municipal legal system. 1 On this approach, a citizen regards it as a
contingent question whether, with regard to a proposed or possible piece of
conduct, there is a valid and applicable legal rule that forbids, requires, or
permits that conduct. If the citizen comes to believe there is a valid legal
rule forbidding the conduct, then he regards himself as under a certain kind
of obligation to refrain from the conduct. If the citizen comes to believe
that there is a valid legal rule requiring that conduct, then she regards
herself as under an obligation of a certain sort to engage in that conduct. To
regard oneself as being under an obligation to engage in certain conduct is
to see oneself as being enjoined, required, and expected to behave that
way-as being held up to a standard of what one is really supposed to do.
The preservation of this basic idea of legal obligation in the face of
jurisprudential theories mounted by many of Hart's predecessors turned out
to be extraordinarily challenging. Much of this essay is an effort to explain
how Hart utilized the notion of the internal point of view-and, in
particular, the notion of the internal aspect of rules-to preserve a
philosophically tenable analysis of legal obligation that did not distort
common sense. Ultimately, however, the Hart analysis in this essay is a
vehicle for a larger goal: to begin to sketch a theory of legal obligation that
can help to reorient questions about the alleged duty to obey the law, about
lawyers' roles in counseling their clients, and about a variety of matters
within substantive legal theory.

* Professor & James H. Quinn Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham University School of Law. I
am grateful to John Goldberg, Stephen Perry, Arthur Ripstein, Tanina Rostain, Tony Sebok,
Scott Shapiro, and Daniel Sinclair for numerous discussions regarding this topic.
1. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 82-91 (2d ed. 1994).
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I. CHALLENGES FOR A COMMONSENSICAL THEORY OF LEGAL

OBLIGATIONS
The defense of this common sense approach was-and is-challenging at
many different levels. First, it conflicts with all of Hart's most esteemed
predecessors within the positivistic tradition:
Jeremy Bentham, John
Austin, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Hans Kelsen. Hart himself did not see
this as an obstacle; on the contrary, the intuitive strength of the observations
he offers was more of a reason to reject his predecessors' views than a
reason to reject his own. 2 But at a broader level, it is fair to say that Hart
faced the task of developing and defending this view in the face of a broad
set of powerful views within his own positivistic tradition that did not view
legal obligations in this manner. All of these figures, in one way or another,
analyzed legal obligations in terms of threats, sanctions, liabilities, or other
concrete potential consequences for subjects of a legal regime.3 From at
least the time of Hobbes, and almost certainly prior to Hobbes, it was
essential to the tradition of legal theory that rejected Thomistic natural law
to connect the very idea of legality and legal obligation with the power of
the state to enforce its law with sanctions. John Austin's "command"
theory was one of Hart's targets; equally important, in my view, were
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s claims in The Path of the Law that "a legal
duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain
things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the
court"4 and his vivid image of the "bad man" as the prototype for
understanding law.5 Spelling out a form of positivism that was equally
antithetical to natural law, but conceived of legal obligation in a manner not
essentially related to the state's power to impose sanctions, was a tall order.
This brings us to the second level of challenge, which Hart himself took
to be central. It is a distinctive feature of legal norms-as opposed to moral
norms-that the existence of the norm does not itself imply anything about
its moral status or justice. 6 It is an entirely open possibility, according to
positivists and in contrast to natural law theorists, that a legal norm
purporting to be authoritative is in fact entirely unjust, and that a citizen
would regard it simultaneously as law and as unjust. Moreover, the conduct
that it directs may be, and may be perceived (correctly) as wrongful conduct
that one ought not to engage in. This is entirely consistent with its being
valid law. In what sense, then, does the ordinary citizen take the law to be
enjoining, requiring, or expecting him to behave a certain way? The
problem is particularly acute when combined with the prior problem, for the
earlier positivists had an easy answer to the question of "in what sense" it

2. Id. at 38-42 (discussing "[d]istortion as the price of uniformity").
3. Id. at 18-19.
4. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 458 (1897),
reprinted in 110 Harv. L. Rev. 991, 992 (1997).

5. Id.
6. Hart, supra note 1, at 210-11.
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was required or enjoined: on pain of sanction. Having eliminated that
answer and the idea that the obligation is essentially a moral one, Hart
defined for himself-and for the protector of the common sense judgments
of the ordinary citizen-an exquisitely difficult philosophical problem.
A third level of challenge is important both to the sophistication of Hart's
actual view and to its capacity to speak to lawyers and legal scholars in
modem systems like our own. A citizen's acquaintance with the laws that
impose obligations upon her can come in more than one form. Citizens are
intimately familiar with some obligations, having learned of them in some
form for their whole lives: the obligation not to kill, the obligation not to
steal, the obligation to pay taxes, the obligation to follow traffic rules, the
obligation not to hit others or to cheat others out of money or to kidnap or
lie under oath, and the obligation to pay debts, keep contracts, et cetera. As
to these obligations, the sense of being morally required and the sense of
being legally required and the sense of being required by social mores and
social expectations tend to merge with one another, although intelligent
adults are nevertheless aware of what it means to see gaps between these
levels.
Yet there is another sort of contact with legal obligations: acquaintance
with obligations that are discovered to exist as a matter of fact, either in
contrast to what was believed or out of total ignorance. Thus, a citizen may
learn that he is required to register his pet, to pay taxes for his babysitters,
or to have his automobile refitted, or forbidden from keeping his children at
home during a religious holiday, from wearing certain clothing, from
having romantic liaisons with various persons at his workplace, from firing
irritating employees, or from declining to rent an apartment to someone
whose sexual preferences he dislikes. Such legal obligations are often
either unrecognized entirely, prior to the person's being officially
"informed" of the obligation, or persistently perceived as either extraneous
to, or in actual conflict with, what is morally required. To this extent, the
classification of these as legal obligations tends to cut in favor of the more
classical positivists and the sanction theorists. Yet, on a certain version of
what "common sense judgments by the ordinary citizen" consist of,7 an
ordinary citizen may regard these as legal obligations imposed by valid
legal rules of which he had not previously been aware. And in thinking
this, he does not necessarily think principally in terms of sanctions. He
thinks of these, too, as obligations in the sense that the law or the legal
system, as requiring, expecting, and enjoining this conduct. 8 Explaining
how the legal system imposes legal obligations in this sense for both the
intimate and the unknown legal norms is an especially difficult task.
Finally, Hart believed that legal obligations-whatever they are-exist in
two very different types of legal systems: those which have accepted and
7. Id. at 2-3 (describing ordinary citizens' common sense knowledge of law).
8. See Hart's reference to the "puzzled man" and the "ignorant man" in Hart, supra
note 1, at 40.
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crystallized secondary legal rules and those which do not have such rules.
Moreover, he believed that an adequate jurisprudential theory should not
rule out by dint of philosophical form, in light of the absence of legal
officials who accept a governing rule of recognition, the possibility that
international law exists and that legal obligations exist within international
law. Because it appears that much of his apparatus for solving the prior
problems in analyzing legal obligations depends upon his employment of
secondary rules within sophisticated legal systems, his insistence on leaving
conceptual space for legal obligations in international law ups the ante even
further.
I. THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW AND THE THEORY OF LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS

A. The Muddle on Legal Obligationsand the InternalPoint of View
Like other members of the Oxford philosophical community that
constituted Hart's intellectual home, Hart's method was to adhere to what
struck him as commonsensical and cogent and to use mighty forces of
philosophical criticism to fend off the apparent reasons for rejecting this
commonsensical view. In the end, like Austin, Gilbert Ryle, and Paul
Grice, each in different ways, Hart did not resist the temptation to construct
an entire system which would end up being its own grand theoretical
edifice. And in the end, like them, he ended up using the methods of
ordinary language philosophy and conceptual analysis to help him in both
the negative and the constructive philosophical enterprises. This is far,
however, from adopting an Archimedean perspective for the purpose of
having the correct philosophical view of law from the god's eye
perspective. 9 It remained, at the end of the day, an enterprise of preserving
the commonsensical approach to law and legal obligation of the ordinary
citizen, without falling into any traps or building any morally or
metaphysically ostentatious framework. 10
Despite the clarity of Hart's writing in The Concept of Law, it is not easy
to assign one clear theory of legal obligation to Hart.1 1 In certain important
9. Contra Ronald Dworkin, Hart's Postscript and the Character of Political
Philosophy, 24 O.J.L.S. 1 (2004) (criticizing Hart's methodology as one aspiring to occupy
an Archimedean perspective).
10. Hart's connection to Oxford's philosophical community is illuminatingly examined
in Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (2004) and
Neil MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart (1981). See also Frederick Schauer, (Re)Taking Hart, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 852 (2006) (reviewing Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare
and the Noble Dream (2004)).
11. The analysis offered by MacCormick of Hart on legal obligations and Hart on the
internal point of view is nuanced and critical, raising a number of the concerns indicated
below. See MacCormick, supra note 10, at 33-40, 55-70. Similarly, Michael Martin's
analyses of legal obligations and of the internal point of view are very helpful in displaying
several of the difficulties and apparent contradictions. See Michael Martin, The Legal
Philosophy of H.L.A. Hart: A Critical Appraisal 15-39 (1987).
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passages of The Concept of Law, Hart seems to suggest that one who is
under a legal obligation must feel some kind of social pressure to comply
with the obligation, and yet at other points he recognizes as a commonplace
part of the social world a figure who is aware of what the rules of law
impose upon him as legal requirements, but content to go about breaking
the law where it suits his interests to do so. At some points he seems to
suggest that legal obligations exist only where there are social rules that are
generally complied with regarding the course of conduct to which there is a
legal obligation, and are complied with because of a mutual selfconsciousness of the importance of complying. 12 On the other hand, there
are key passages where Hart imagines a citizen who is under a legal
obligation, but is not aware that he is. Indeed, it is arguable that on Hart's
view, the majority of people could be unaware of some legal obligation that
applies to them.
Similarly, despite the excellent illustrations and simple but evocative
images used by Hart to describe "the internal point of view," that phrase has
multiple and shifting meanings within Hart scholarship and, probably,
within The Concept of Law itself. It sometimes appears to mean the
perspective of a participant in a legal system, but then there is a description
of a bad-man participant who is said to occupy the "external point of
view." 1 3 This leads one to believe that the internal point of view must be
not simply the participant perspective, but the perspective of a "lawabiding" citizen, as opposed to a Holmesian bad man. But then one finds
Hart suggesting that the legal theorist is said to need a "descriptive"
perspective that takes seriously the internal point of view, but does so only
from the perspective of a theorist outside of the practice; here the internal
point of view seems to be that which an external theorist takes seriously. 14
When Hart discusses "internal statements" it is critical that they are
statements made by someone who occupies the internal point of view, but
here what is relevant is the acceptance of the rule of recognition as a social
rule. 15 This leaves it unclear to what extent acceptance of primary rules of
conduct is necessary for the internal point of view. It might be tempting to
suppose that occupying the internal point of view is relevant only to legal
officials, but it is plain that Hart meant to talk about ordinary citizens who
are planning their lives and being guided by the law.
At this stage, more than forty years after the publication of The Concept
of Law, at least some of these misconceptions can be cleared away. Hart
did not think being under a legal obligation necessarily required accepting a

12. This is the source of one of Dworkin's criticisms of Hart in his chapter "The Model
of Rules II." See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 46-80 (1977).
13. Hart, supra note 1, at 90 ("The external point of view may very nearly reproduce the
way in which the rules function in the lives of certain members of the group .....
14. Id. at 240.
15. Id. at 102.
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social rule. 16 While he did believe that obligations are a classification
applied to legal obligation in some part because they are, in form,
accompanied by the imposition of pressure, 17 he did not believe that every
person who in fact had an obligation in fact felt pressure. Hart did not
believe that legal obligations exist only where there are widely accepted or
conventional social rules regarding the content of the obligation.' 8 More
affirmatively, Hart thought that Austin's and Holmes's sanction-based
theories of legal obligation were inadequate. He thought they were
inadequate at least in part because they failed to capture the notion of legal
obligation. The ability to understand the internal aspect of rules or law
from the internal point of view, rather than from the external point of view
of the bad man, would be critical to an adequate conception of legal
obligation.
B. Perry Versus Shapiro on Hart Versus Holmes
In a sophisticated and powerful pair of articles on Hart versus Holmes,
Stephen Perry and Scott Shapiro offer dueling interpretations of the role of
the internal point of view in Hart's critique of sanction-based views of legal
obligation. 19 Perry reconstructs Hart's analysis of the sense in which law
provides reasons for action, and then offers both a criticism and a
sympathetic proposal for supplementation which calls for Hart to take a
normative turn in his methodology. And in his response to Perry, Shapiro
offers a quite different analysis, one that changes the emphasis on the
internal point of view, and purports, in doing so, to resist Perry's argument
that Hart needed to supplement his analysis by taking a normative turn. I
shall use this pair of articles, in what follows, to motivate a rejection of the
conception of the internal point of view that Perry and Shapiro share.
Both Perry and Shapiro seize on the following language in Hart's section
"The Idea of Obligation":
What the external point of view, which limits itself to the observable
regularities of behaviour, cannot reproduce is the way in which the rules
function as rules in the lives of those who normally are the majority of
society. These are the officials, lawyers, or private persons who use them,
in one situation after another, as guides to the conduct of social life, as the
basis for claims, demands, admissions, criticism, or punishment, viz., in
all the familiar transactions of life according to rules. For them the
violation of a rule is not merely a basis for the prediction that a hostile
reaction will follow but a reason for hostility.
16. Hart, supra note 1, at 256-57 (distinguishing enacted legal rules from judicial

customary legal rules and stating that the practice theory is inapplicable to the former).
17. Id. at 88.
18. Id. at 257.
19. Stephen R. Perry, Holmes versus Hart: The Bad Man in Legal Theory, in The Path
of the Law and Its Influence: The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 158-96 (Steven J.
Burton ed., 2000); Scott J. Shapiro, The Bad Man and the Internal Point of View, in The
Path of the Law and Its Influence: The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., supra, at 197210.
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At any given moment the life of any society which lives by rules, legal
or not, is likely to consist in a tension between those who, on the one
hand, accept and voluntarily co-operate in maintaining the rules, and so
see their own and other persons' behaviour in terms of the rules, and those
who, on the other hand, reject the rules and attend to them only from the
external point of view as a sign of possible punishment. One of the
difficulties facing any legal theory anxious to do justice to the complexity
of the facts is to remember the presence of both these points of view and
not to define one of them out of existence. Perhaps all our criticisms of
the predictive theory of obligation may be best summarized as the
accusation that this is what it does to the internal aspect of obligatory
20
rules.
Perry notes that Hart criticizes the predictive theory of obligation because it
caters to the external point of view. 2 1 Because an adequate jurisprudential
theory needs to explain the practice from the point of view of the engaged
participant, rather than one who stands outside the practice, the predictive
theory of obligation fails. Hart's theory of obligation, by countenancing the
perspective of the ordinary participant, surmounts this problem and is
therefore superior to Holmes's predictive theory. 2 2 So concludes the
argument that Perry attributes to Hart.
The problem with the argument just rehearsed, according to Perry, is that
it does not take seriously the idea that Holmes's bad man perspective is
itself a participant perspective. 23 While in one respect it is "external"-it
does not involve any sort of allegiance to the rule for its own sake-this
does not make it external in the sense that a theorist's perspective is
external; it is, according to Hart, clearly one way that participants could and
sometimes do look at the rules. As far as Hart's rather informally put
suggestion that the majority normally take a different perspective, it is too
weak and undefended as an empirical claim to pick up the slack in Hart's
argument.
Moreover, Perry argued that Holmes or a Holmesian
jurisprudence can offer a broader picture of the role of law in providing
24
reasons for action, all of which is consistent with the bad man perspective.
Thus, it is not true that capturing the perspective of a participant forces one
into a jurisprudence of a sort that interprets obligations as standards of
conduct, rather than as predictions of sanctions. Perry's next move is to
argue that, if a Hartian jurisprudence is to be elevated over a Holmesian
one, it is necessary for Hart to take a normative turn in his methodology that
embraces the moral superiority of an account of law that understands it as a
form of social control that emphasizes guidance, rather than coercion by

20.
21.
22.
23.

Hart, supra note 1, at 90-91.
Perry, supra note 19, at 162-65.
Id. at 164-65.
Id. at 165.

24. Id. at 165-76.
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sanction. 2 5 Perry thought that such a normative turn was already implicit in
Hart's work.
Shapiro argues cogently-particularly in light of the latter part of the
passage quoted above-that Hart did not overlook the two different types of
participant perspectives, and recognized that both were in one sense
"internal" to practice. 26 Hart's critique of the sanction theory, according to
Shapiro, was that it left no conceptual space whatsoever for the nonHolmesian perspective, which is (Shapiro contends) what Hart was
referring to by "the internal point of view" (in connection with primary
rules). The theory Hart himself advanced sees legal obligations as existing
so long as valid primary rules within an extant system exist. It thereby cuts
the conceptual tie to the prediction of sanction. But this does not mean that
it forces the conclusion that legal participants take the internal point of view
of the law-abiding citizen. On the contrary, it deliberately leaves the
question open with regard to ordinary citizens. There is other heavy lifting
for "the internal point of view" to do within Hart's theory, Shapiro argues,
but this concerns the internal point of view of legal officials who accept the
rule of recognition; Holmes's omission of the rule-acceptance attitude
condemned his view at the level of legal officials, not at the level of
ordinary citizens. 27 Hence, there is no need to see Hart as taking a
normative turn, even conceding that Perry is right about the availability of a
bad-man perspective of a participant. And there is no need for Hart to take
a position on whether ordinary citizens more frequently or less frequently
take a bad man perspective, although Hart himself expressed his not-socynical hunch that the majority did not take the bad man perspective.
In essence, Shapiro therefore concedes that Perry is right about at least
the following: Without a normative turn, 2 8 Hart does not have a sound
argument that the internal point of view on legal obligations is
jurisprudentially fundamental at the level of primary rules. Shapiro's
response is that it is a misconstrual of Hart's goals to suppose that he aimed
to make the internal point of view fundamental to legal obligations at the
level of primary rules.
Although I cannot do justice to Shapiro's position here, I believe that a
fair reading of Hart's discussion of "The Idea of Obligation" casts doubt on
Shapiro's effort to downplay the importance of the internal point of view to
Hart's understanding of the nature of legal obligations. At several different
points, Hart makes it clear that an understanding of the concept of
obligation in non-sanction based terms, as it applies to primary rules of
conduct, is centrally important to the whole enterprise of jurisprudence.
Here is one of the most powerful passages:

25. Id. at 191-92.
26. Shapiro, supra note 19, at 203.
27. Id. at 208-09.
28. This sentence should not be read to suggest that Shapiro believes Perry's normative
turn would be helpful to Hart.
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The difference may seem slight between the analysis of a statement of
obligation as a prediction, or assessment of the chances, of hostile
reaction to deviation, and our own contention that though this statement
presupposes a background in which deviations from rules are generally
met by hostile reactions, yet its characteristic use is not to predict this but
to say that a person's case falls under such a rule. In fact, however, this
difference is not a slight one. Indeed, until its importance is grasped, we
cannot properly understand the whole distinctive style of human thought,
speech, and action which is involved in the existence
of rules and which
29
constitutes the normative structure of society.
In his seminal essay on Hart's internal point of view in this Symposium,
Shapiro interprets this passage as a manifestation of Hart's intention "to
render the thoughts and discourse of legal actors comprehensible," not to
give an account of "the reason-giving nature of legal practice." I do not
read Hart's stated aspiration to understand "the normative structure of
society" so narrowly. Nor do I think Hart's conception of rendering
30
thoughts "comprehensible" was theoretically inert.
We are left, then, in something of a bind. Hart did not think that all
ordinary members of a legal community took the perspective of the lawabiding citizen who treats the law as a guide to conduct; he thought some
did and some did not. And yet he seemed to think the perspective of legal
rules as setting a standard of conduct, not merely as facilitating sanction
prediction, was fundamental to understanding
legal obligation.
Notwithstanding various hints throughout his work that Hart was sometimes
attracted to normative methodologies, Perry's normative turn argument
must ultimately be taken as a critique of Hart, not as an interpretation of
what he aimed to do. It therefore appears that there is a substantial hole in
the center of Hart's account of legal obligation.
C. Legal Obligationsand the Internal Aspect of Primary Rules
1. The Basic Idea
The solution to this problem begins with a recognition that the core of
Hart's argument is not so much about the experience of the citizen seeing
the law as it is about the aspect of the law that is seen by citizens. In the
philosophy of language and the theory of meaning, a parallel point would
be that to understand meaning is to understand a property of pieces of
language, not to understand what is in the head of the language-users.
Capturing Hart's theoretical work on the nature of legal obligation requires
the same move. To push Hart's terms a bit further than he himself may
have, we can say that Hart's analysis of legal obligations does not rest
principally on the notion of the internalpoint of view as the perspective of a
29. Hart, supra note 1, at 88.
30. Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1157,
1166 (2006)
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3
law-abiding citizen; it rests on the notion of the internal aspect of rules. '
Understandably, Hart himself sometimes blurred these two ideas, and used
the phrase "the internal point of view" to refer to the perspective from
which the internal aspect of rules was seen. 32 But what is critical is the
connection between the internal aspect of primary rules of conduct and the
idea of a legal obligation.
Primary legal rules, for Hart, are like the rules of a social club or a school
or a swimming facility. Their authority does not lie in their having been
issued by a person whose will is superior to that of a citizen. Their
authority lies in their being properly positioned as authoritative law. Their
syntactical form is indeed often imperatival, but that is not necessarily a
reflection of their embodiment of an enjoiner in a dyadic power relation
with the person empowered. An interrogative can exist on a page without a
questioner present. What matters-as in language and meaning generallyis that the rule exists within a context in which members of a community
regard the expression as properly interpreted and responded to in a certain
manner. The injunctive quality of legal directives is what Hart has in mind
when he calls them "duty-imposing rules." 33 Their content is such that they
purport to direct individuals to act or not to act in a certain manner.
Citizen C has a legal obligation to do A, according to Hart, if there is a
valid legal rule applicable to C that enjoins the performance of A: Do A.
Here are some examples:
"It is a felony to carry a concealed weapon."

"Every soldier shall carry his or her weapon and badge at all times."
"No one may engage in electronic eavesdropping without the consent of
either party, unless he or she has a validly issued warrant."
"No one is to interfere with another's use and enjoyment of her property."
Now one of the most difficult challenges of the foregoing model is what it
would mean to say that "members of a community regard the expression as
properly interpreted and responded to in a certain manner." Here are the
31. Id. at 56-57 (introducing the "internal aspect of rules").
32. Hart's conflation of these closely related ideas is interestingly seen in a passage that
Shapiro quotes in his response to Perry:
One of the difficulties facing any legal theory anxious to do justice to the
complexity of the facts is to remember the presence of both these points of view
and not to define one of them out of existence. Perhaps all our criticisms of the
predictive theory of obligation may be best summarized as the accusation that this
is what it does to the internal aspect of obligatoryrules.
Hart, supra note 1, at 91 (emphasis added). In the first of the two sentences quoted above,
Hart is referring to the "difficulty" (or challenge) of not defining "one of' these "points of
view" out of existence. He then concludes by suggesting that his critique of the predictive
theory is summarized by saying that "this is what it does," presumably to "the internal point
of view." However the noun phrase at the end of this passage is not "the internal point of
view" but "the internal aspect of obligatory rules." Id.
33. Id. at 27.
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beginnings of an answer: A legal norm of the form, "All persons shall
refrain from X-ing" or "X-ing is prohibited" or "X is a crime" enjoins
conduct if it is part of the meaning and force of the norm to direct its
audience to act (or refrain from acting) in a certain way. This means,
typically, that its force as a standing statement is imperatival and its content
is directive in the sense mentioned. The possibility of its force being
imperatival and its content directive depends, to a large extent, on the
existence of conventional social practices of treating them as such within
the community.
Now we come to a difficult theoretical juncture. It is possible that the
words themselves have this meaning and the language itself conveys this
force. More broadly, it is possible that there are linguistic rules whose
content does not itself depend on a feature of the legal system, in virtue of
which the meaning and force of the primary rule is as indicated. And it is
possible that the set of practices that constitute this are linguistic practices.
The alternative is that the set of rules, features, and practices in light of
which it has this force is not wholly internal to the language. The most
plausible development of this idea is that there are practices within our
legal system according to which statements that appear in certain contexts
are understood as having certain meaning and force.
A variety of social practices quite different from law exemplify the same
sort of phenomenon, at least in very basic form. Thus, we learn how to
respond to jokes, performances, and acts, both in terms of understanding
when some course of conduct is part of a performance and in terms of how
it is conventional to respond to the performance. We decide for ourselves,
to at least some extent, whether the joke is funny, the performance
compelling, and the concert entertaining, but we know how to smile, laugh
(or not smile or not laugh), when to take the words seriously or as a
performance, and when to clap (or boo). Similarly, one learns what the law
is, and how one is expected to respond to it; one understands that the law
aspires to do good or be just or fair or necessary in some way, but quite
apart from whether one views it as hitting the mark, one knows how one is
expected to respond. These bits of communication are in significant part
linguistic, and one must have command of the language being used to
understand the joke (or the dramatic performance). But the linguistic
conventions are not the only ones in play; the conventions of humor or
performance are also brought to bear.
Now, to be inside this practice is not simply a subset of being inside a
linguistic practice, but it is analogous to that. One need not accept every
assertion made in order to understand the assertion, but understanding the
assertion involves grasping-as one hears the assertion-what it is one is
intended to believe. Similarly, one need not obey the law to understand its
content and to understand its content as law. But one must understand that
it is enjoining, that it purports to direct action, and that it purports to do so
in the special way that law does. A competent member of a legal system
understands primary rules within the legal system as enjoining conduct.
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The perspective from which the law is so perceived is what I shall call the
"participant's view" of the ordinary citizen who is a competent member of
the legal/political community. It is also tempting to call this the "internal
point of view" on law, and I will sometimes do so. I believe that this is the
point of view from which one sees what Hart called the "internal aspect of
rules," and to that extent it would fit with his idea of "the internal point of
view." I shall suggest later in this essay that this is probably not precisely
what Hart meant by the "internal point of view." Nevertheless, it is fair to
read Hart as aiming to solve a variety of problems about the nature of legal
obligation from within a framework that takes seriously the internal aspect
of rules from an ordinary citizen's perspective: What, in addition, he may
have been trying to do with an even richer notion of "the internal point
view" is something to be addressed below.
It is entirely possible to be a competent member of the legal community
and to conduct oneself as the bad man does. Similarly, it is possible to
conduct oneself as the law-abiding citizen that Hart captures in The Concept
of Law. Imagine, by way of analogy, that a duo of sitcom producers might
both understand the jokes in a show, and might be equally capable of
selecting good writers or actors or editing in and out the right scenes, even
if one of the producers spontaneously laughed in the right places, while the
other saw the jokes, but was no longer moved to laugh himself. The
general point is that to be socialized and habituated in such a manner that
one recognizes and picks up on the conventional significance of a kind of
act that has a certain force and meaning is not necessarily to be disposed to
act in a manner that the force is designed to create. Hart is therefore at least
prima facie correct when he states that it is an open question to what degree
citizens must adopt a basically law-abiding stance and for what reasons they
must do so. 34 One might say, similarly, with regard to language, it is an
open question how skeptical, humorous, or facetious language users may be
and how many of them may be so.
Of course, in language there are perhaps limits on how much
facetiousness there may be, and the limits are in a sense analytical and in a
sense practical. At a certain point in time, for example, if enough people
use "wicked" to mean good (and few enough people ever use it to mean
anything else), it ceases to be facetious and it ceases to mean wicked"wicked" comes to mean good. At a certain point the requirement to obey
34. See Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 153-57 (1979).
Raz's argument that Hart needs the notion of a detached statement is supportive of the
general approach I am taking, but the notion of a detached statement does not capture what I
am referring to, for it (quite expressly) presumes that the speaker is withholding commitment
from the internal point of view. What we need here is what is in common between the
detached statement and an internal statement. Removing oneself (as opposed to accepting) is
a direction to take. Similarly, accepting an assertion and rejecting an assertion are two
different responses, but understanding the assertion is common to both. Critical, from a
hermeneutic point of view, is grasping that the (putative) legal norm is enjoining conduct
and grasping what it is enjoining.

The compliant and the manipulative, the good and the

bad, and the detached all see this aspect of primary rules.
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the speed limit of fifty-five may turn into a requirement to drive less than
sixty-five, or it may turn into a liability rule or something that is neither a
primary rule of conduct nor a liability rule.
The point of view from which one sees the internal aspect of rules is
therefore the legally socialized point of view, the point of view of the
citizen who is sufficiently trained and nurtured in our legal culture to have a
sense of what legal rules are, what they mean, how they are to be identified,
and so on. The conventionalist (and somewhat Wittgensteinian and J.L.
Austin-like) hypothesis I am urging is that the positioned and
contextualized directives that count as laws are conventionally treated by
competent members of the legal community as specially positioned,
general, standing injunctions to act a certain way. The attributes that make
such a directive duty-imposing are those attributes that a conventionally
sensitized member of the community is sensitized to perceive as exhortative
and injunctive.
The upshot is that there are rules that specify what our legal duties are,
and that these rules-these laws-structure practical questions about what
to do by telling citizens what they may and may not do within the limits of
the law. This does not necessarily dictate what should be done,
prudentially, morally, or all told. But knowing that some course of conduct
is a violation of one's legal duties pushes one to the question of whether
one may or ought to breach one's legal duties in a certain situation, and if
so, why.
Taking Hart in this direction responds to Perry's claim that both the
Holmesian self-interest calculator and the Hartian law-abiding citizen are
cogent viewpoints, jurisprudentially, without concluding that Hart must turn
to a normative methodology vis-A-vis the law's function in order to rescue
his claim that a non-sanction based conception of legal obligation is
fundamental to understanding law. Nor must we sign on with a claim
agreed to by both Shapiro and Perry that, because there is variation among
citizens, there must be an empirical basis for any sweeping claim about how
law is understood. The analysis of legal obligations does not flow from an
account of how a certain kind of person responds to the law. It flows from
an account of what the conventional significance and force of primary legal
rules are, qua primary legal rules.
To the extent that the model presented above depends on an account of
the meaning and force of primary legal rules, it makes even more
conspicuous that the argument offered here is incomplete, because no such
general theory has been provided. Three considerations ought to be
mentioned, however. First, even beyond the reasons already mentioned, it
is an advantage to cast the theory in this light, for it connects with an
important literature on whether legal rules should be understood as liabilityimposing, rights-conferring, duty-imposing, guidance-providing, or some
combination of these. The most famous contribution to this literature in the
past several decades is Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed's
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
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Cathedral,35 but some of the most important developments in this area,
which have been critical of the Calabresi/Melamed framework, have
36
expressly connected with Hartian conceptions of legal obligation.
Second, Hart, following Austin, Bentham, Kelsen, and Holmes, within
jurisprudence, and following J.L. Austin and Ryle within philosophical
methodology more generally, appears to have been intending to offer an
account that was analytical in the sense of being rooted in the structure of
the language utilized in the structure of legal norms.
Third, the
conventionalistic and Wittgensteinian tilt toward social practices, which the
account here gestures towards, is plainly consistent with the hermeneutic
and practice-based aspirations of Hart's enterprise. 37 These observations
are not intended to substitute for a more thorough semantical and practicebased model, but they are intended to provide reasons to believe that the
idea of such a model is promising both in legal theory generally, and as to
Hart scholarship in particular.
2. Initial Problems Revisited
Let us return to our initial question: Is it essential to legal obligations
that their violation is attended by sanction? The answer, for Hart, was "no,"
but a doubly qualified no. In the first instance, having a sanction attached
to noncompliance is not part of what it is for there to be a legal obligation.
The concept of legal obligation is cashed out by reference to the injunctive
force of a valid primary rule of conduct. Such a rule does not depend for its
existence on a sanction. On the other hand, part of the reasons the rules of
law generate what we are willing to call "obligations," as a general matter,
is that the institution of law carries with it a variety of pressures and forces,
including those of sanctions. So it is, at a general level, important to the
species of injunctions characteristic of law that they are attended by
sanctions, but that is not in fact essential to what it is to say that a legal
obligation exists, or what it is to have a legal obligation. Secondly, modem
municipal legal systems generally, and not coincidentally, have other rules
that confer powers upon individuals and the state to enforce rules or seek
redress for their violation. Hence, there is a systematic connection,
normally, between obligations and sanctions. In this way, Hart has finessed
the sanctions issue so that it does not go to the very nature of a legal
obligation or to the force of a legal norm. The legal obligation exists as the
complement of the injunctive primary rule of conduct. So it is an open
35. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
36. See Jules A. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 Yale
L.J. 1335 (1986); Dale A. Nance, GuidanceRules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of
the Cathedral, 83 Va. L. Rev. 837 (1997). This essay builds on my own critique of

Calabresi and Melamed, which drew upon a Hartian conception of legal obligation. See
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 Vand. L. Rev.
1, 55-60 (1998).
37. See Lacey, supra note 10; MacCormick, supra note 10.
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possibility that sanctions are required, but the theory of obligations is
guidance- and injunction-based, not threat- or sanction-based.
Holmes's critique of the notion of legal duties and his appeal to the bad
man make very little sense if we are thinking of reasonably well-drafted
statutory law that has a regulative aim. Here, Hart's analysis fits perfectly.
When a client asks what his legal duties are with regard to PCP emissions,
the analytical framework for answering does not require resort to morality
or to the bad man or to the good man. The questions should be interpreted
as asking what the regulations and statutes regarding such emissions say
that a person in the client's position must do or not do. The client may
appreciate or even ask for some soothsaying by the lawyer. But the real
question is what the law says she has to do.
Holmes was a common law scholar above all, and was speaking in The
Path of the Law to a group of graduates who had just departed from an
education in the common law for legal practice that had relatively little
regulation. And so the law contained few obvious directives specifying
what was or was not to be done. Rather, it contained cases deciding
whether or not to hold someone liable in a particular situation. The
problem of identifying a legal directive here has three components. The
first is that the court is ultimately deciding about liabilities of defendants to
plaintiffs, not about defendants' required conduct. The second is that there
is no pronouncement by a legislative body of a rule of conduct. And the
third is that it is case-by-case ex post rulings by legal officials, not ex ante
38
injunctions of conduct.
The critical question is how-if not essentially sanction-based but rather
normative-the nature of legal obligations can be understood in a manner
that, in principle, keeps law as something distinct from morality. The
answer for Hart goes to the root of his positivism, and, in essence, is
conventionalistic. The answer is that the character of the legal directive
imposing the duty is injunctive and normative, but the criteria for what
counts as a legal norm are artificial and conventionalistic, and not
essentially moral. More broadly put, the directives of law do present
themselves as injunctive-they do exhort action as to-be-done, but our
shared social understanding of what makes some directives the binding
legal directives are not, essentially, value-based. Hence, from the discovery
38. Professor John Goldberg and I have elsewhere offered a Hartian, primary ruleoriented response to the critique of duty in The Path of the Law. John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart
on Legal Duties, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1563 (2006). Here, I present just our basic story:
First, the nature of tort law is to predicate the imposition of liability upon the recognition of a
power in the plaintiff, and to predicate the power upon a finding of a breach of a duty of
conduct by the defendant. Hence, duties of conduct are critical. The second is that-as
Austin himself recognized and as Hart and Raz have both recognized-courts are
empowered to articulate law, including the articulation of primary rules of conduct. Third,
Hart's rules of recognition render it coherent to suppose that primary rules exist within the
law by virtue of being identifiable according to secondary legal rules that courts articulate
and utilize.
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perspective of the citizen, at least, the law says what may and may not be
done, but it is the law speaking, not morality.
Turn now to the spectrum of primary rules from the intimate to the
undiscovered. To be sure, there are many primary legal rules of which
individuals are aware and with which they consciously comply. These may
be widely believed to be moral duties (or not). In any case, the legal
directive that imposes the duty is recognized as a member of the legal
system applicable to the citizens. But a legal directive need not be
recognized in order for it to be a member of the legal system and in order
for it to be valid. Rules of recognition exist that determine which legal
directives exist as part of the system and which are valid. A legal duty
exists if the legal directive is valid according to an extant rule of
recognition. Hence, a person could discover or learn of a legal directive
that neither he-nor perhaps even others-had recognized. In this case, one
would also be learning of one's legal duties.
Let us briefly turn to international law. There are, to be sure, primary
legal rules-legal directives-that purport to speak internationally. To the
extent that such primary rules are valid law, they impose legal duties. Hart
denies that having law requires having a full-fledged legal system as the
union of primary and secondary rules, with a group of legal officials for
whom the rule of recognition is a social rule. This denial is entirely
plausible: There is no a priori reason why such law would not be possible.
Nevertheless, one wonders how competency in identifying and
interpreting law is possible in the international domain; one wonders
whether there is any reason to suppose that there are rules that are
conventionally regarded as law, and how it is possible for there to be such
rules. The short answer is that there are such pieces of international law,
and that the question of how it is possible is difficult in the international
arena but also difficult in the domestic arena, and the existence of
secondary legal rules is not the answer to that question in the domestic
arena, either.
III.

THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A COMMONSENSICAL VIEW OF

LEGAL OBLIGATIONS

A. Is There a Moral Duty to Comply with One's Legal Obligations?
Many legal thinkers, from Hobbes through contemporary positivists, take
law to play a critical settlement function in the state. And some purport to
deduce that citizens, recognizing a legal obligation, have a prima facie
moral obligation to comply with that obligation. Because Hart's occupant
of the internal point of view is naturally conceived as a morally upstanding
citizen (in opposition to Holmes's bad man), one might then expect a
proponent of the internal point of view to maintain that there is a moral duty
to obey the law. However, the analysis that follows stops short of the
conclusion that there is a prima facie moral obligation to obey the law,
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leaving a fairly wide space for different political systems and different
views of the most defensible stance to take toward the question of whether
legal obligations command allegiance from a moral point of view, and if so,
with what stringency (or defeasibility) and for what reasons. As explained
below, this does not necessarily undercut the significance of a theory of law
according to which law imposes a form of obligation.
The essence of the view put forward here is that legal norms impose
obligations in the following respect: They enjoin conduct and are of a sort
that is understood by socialized members of the legal community to be
enjoining. This means that adequately socialized members understand it as
demanded and expected of them as members of the community. To
understand the laws as having this force is not necessarily to hold a moral
or political evaluation of the legal system that would yield the conclusion
that the system that creates or enforces these laws is, from a moral point of
view, entitled to this allegiance. It is not even clear why it presupposes the
view that the system is prima facie entitled to this allegiance, from a moral
point of view.
A more difficult question is the following: If one believes that the legal
and political systems are legitimate, and one recognizes the political system
as imposing obligations or demanding conduct, does one have a prima facie
moral obligation to obey the law? The short answer is that the notion of a
"prima facie" or "defeasible" moral obligation to obey the law is probably
much too crude to capture the broad domain of laws and citizens and
contexts: Like being a "team player," a loyal friend, or a gentle parent,
being a law-abiding citizen is a morally commendable attribute in a very
general way, for reasons that run quite deep. But the very idea touches off a
cascade of counterexamples that will, in their own way, run very deep too.
A whistleblower, a person with the integrity to stand up for what is right
notwithstanding a painful rupture in personal relationships, a parent willing
to set standards with a child-these, too, can be commendable figures in
some contexts. The same is true of the citizen who does not obey the law,
and it is far from clear that all such cases will be properly represented as
involving the "outweighing" of a prima facie moral obligation to obey the
law: Some teams do not deserve allegiance in the first place.
Of course, these efforts to constrict the moral significance of legal
obligations pose the question of why it matters whether laws impose legal
obligations of conduct. Why does it matter, if there is not even a prima
facie moral obligation to comply with legal obligations?
The answer has at least three components. First, it is relevant to the
practical question of what to do in a manner that does not relate solely to
the probability of sanctions, even if it is not precisely correct that there is a
moral obligation to obey the law. Explaining why will constitute the
remainder of this section. Second, and of course quite relevant here, the
conception of law as imposing a special kind of obligation fits with a
certain picture of what a lawyer's role is, especially in connection with
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counseling. And third, there are significant implications for substantive
legal theory in a number of areas.
B. Why Does It Matter Whether the Law Imposes Legal Obligations and
What They Are Like?
The short answer is that it does matter because many members of society
do, in fact, wish to comply With their legal obligations. The reasons they
wish to do so vary. Clearly, many people (including Hart) believe that a
certain course of conduct's being legally obligatory normally counts
substantially in favor of its being morally obligatory. 39 And again many
people believe that a course of conduct's being legally obligatory counts
heavily in favor of its being prudent. This is not only because of potential
legal sanctions. It also relates to reputational concerns. And, as Hart would
have been happy to point out, I think, remaining within one's legal
obligations fosters an easier road to planning and to many kinds of joint
undertakings and many other forms of empowerment: borrowing money,
getting a job, starting a business, keeping a business afloat, having a bank
account and credit card; these are only a few examples. But it is more than
this. Keeping inside one's legal obligations-both for individuals and for
companies-is part of coping and negotiating life in a society. It is, to
borrow from Frederick Schauer, desirable in the same sense that people
40
playing baseball want to know how to play by the rules.
Recall that this was the short answer. A longer answer would do several
things. First, it would aim to provide evidence that members of society do,
in fact, wish to comply with their legal obligations, rather than simply
asserting it.
Second, it would explain, in greater detail, why the
obligatoriness of a course of conduct should weigh heavily both on the
moral front and on the prudential front, and do so in a manner that did not
succumb to a "prima facie moral duty to obey the law" view or to a
sanctions-based view of legal obligations; telling the "negotiating the social
world" story will be integral to these accounts. Third, it would offer a
picture of the variety of different stances toward legal obligations that we
find within society, both across different actors, and across different types
of law, and it would do so within a framework that integrated the abovementioned concerns. If these theoretical commitments were dispatched, the
resulting theory would look quite different than one which simply asserted
that obeying legal obligations was the moral or the prudent thing to do.
Additionally-and perhaps most importantly from the point of view of
Hart scholarship-there is a hermeneutical account to be given on the role
of legal obligations within society. Hart clearly believed that law was a
particular kind of practice that effected a certain form of social control. A
39. See H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any NaturalRights?, 64 Phil. Rev. 175 (1955); see also

MacCormick, supra note 10, at 155-58.
40. Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules:

A Philosophical Examination of Rule-

Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 199 (1993).
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part of doing so was the creation and sustenance of a set of rules-lawsmembership which gave certain social norms a special sort of status. These
norms claim the allegiance of citizens. Hart envisioned a figure whom we
might call the law-abiding citizen-who treated valid primary rules as
enjoining certain conduct. And Hart envisioned this citizen as respecting
the authority of the law and therefore expecting himself and others to
comply with the relevant primary rule. Just as the moral citizen is disposed
to succumb to a norm that imposes moral pressure, so the law-abiding
citizen is disposed to succumb to a legal norm that imposes legal pressure.
Part of Hart's explanation of law's efficacy relates to the citizenry's taking
the legal point of view. The obligations of the law are not so much special
cases of applied moral obligations. They are rather a parallel sort of
obligation and speak to a different (although not necessarily inconsistent)
disposition of the citizen.
Understood in this manner, legal obligations are their own kind of
"ought." By way of comparison, a person occupying the moral point of
view might proceed through a pattern of reasoning that would lead her to
the conclusion that a certain course of conduct is the one that she morally
ought to do, and then might in effect see no further need for practical
reasoning; she might simply act because she was disposed and motivated to
do what was morally obligatory because of its being morally obligatory
(and perhaps for other reasons too). A person occupying the legal point of
view might similarly be motivated to comply with a certain form of conduct
because it was legally obligatory. Its being a legal obligation might serve
as reason enough to do it, for such a figure.
As just described, the internal point of view exists with respect to a legal
system, not with respect to any particular rule. The point is that to discover
a particular duty-imposing rule exists would itself motivate the actor to
comply with the rule, because she would regard herself as under a (legal)
obligation to do so. But it would be possible to occupy the internal point of
view with respect to the legal system and to be ignorant of, or mistaken
about, which legal obligations obtained. 4 1 It is critical, for Hart, that legal
officials occupy the internal point of view in this sense, at least with respect
to secondary legal rules. But Hart seemed to believe that it was not
essential that ordinary citizens in a modem municipal system occupy this
point of view, although he thought many (perhaps the majority) did, and
that this was probably a significant fact.
The analysis above returns us to a suggestion made at the onset of the
affirmative reconstruction of Hart in this paper: There is slippage in Hart's
usage of the phrase "the internal point of view." On the one hand, it can
mean what I have called the participant's perspective, that from which the
participant recognizes the internal aspect of rules, from which she is
equipped or sensitized to take primary rules as having a certain injunctive
41. See Hart, supra note 1, at 40 (discussing the

man").

"puzzled man" and the "ignorant

1248

FORDHAM LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 75

force and pressure. On the other hand, it can mean the parallel, for law, of
the moral point of view-what I will call the law-abiding citizen's point of
view, from which the recognition of the applicability of a legal obligation
itself is treated as a special kind of reason to comply with the norm. The
legal official, for Hart, occupies the internal point of view in both respects.
And there may be ordinary citizens who do, too; in the passage quoted
above, Hart-with a double qualification-suggested that "normally" the
"majority" of society takes this point of view. 4 2 But what is necessary in a
legal system in order for the primary rules to be primary rules and to
impose legal obligations, according to Hart, is that the ordinary citizens in
general do see the internal aspect of the primary rules. In other words, the
of the sense
participant's perspective is more fundamental to Hart's account
43
in which laws are primary rules that impose legal obligations.
IV.

LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE LAWYER AS COUNSELOR

The conception of legal obligations offered above is conducive to a
moderate and attractive picture of the role of lawyers in counseling. When
a client asks a lawyer for advice with regard to a potential course of
conduct, part of what the client is typically asking about is whether there are
legal obligations that the client should be aware of. After all, lawyers are
knowledgeable about legal obligations, including what those obligations
are, and how they are likely to be interpreted. More particularly,
ascertaining legal obligations-identifying valid primary rules, interpreting
those rules, and predicting what will be so identified-is the expertise
uniquely possessed by lawyers. Clients like to know how the law binds
their conduct; they want to know what conduct will remain within the law.
Note that the enterprise of saying what the legal obligations are is quite
different from saying what the bad man wants to hear. It is not necessarily
about what will likely get the client in trouble. It is about what the rules say
the client is not supposed to do, regardless of whether the client is likely to
be punished for doing it.
Similarly, the enterprise is quite different from saying what the client
morally should do. What the client is getting from her lawyer, in the first
instance, is knowledge of what the legal system enumerates as the relevant
set of obligations: a list of what has to be done, according to the law. Of
course, there are gray areas and uncertainties. And the client will often
want to know what the lawyer thinks he or she should do, all considered.
But one could analyze that question, at least in counseling, as a request for
advice on how to make the best decision on compliance with legal

42. Id. at 90
43. This leaves open the claim, made most forcefully by Scott Shapiro, that the
conception of the "internal point of view" which entails norm acceptance is fundamental to
Hart's treatment of legal officials, which is, in turn, fundamental to his entire explanation of
how it is that a legal system could exist as the legal system of a community. Shapiro, supra
note 30, at 1169-70.
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obligations, which is ultimately the practical question for which the lawyer
is consulted. While it may in some abstract sense strike clients and lawyers
as more conducive to client autonomy to have the lawyer articulate all the
relevant categories of applicable legal rules and obligations and leave the
client to reach her own conclusions on what ought to be done, in law (as in
medicine, for example), that is sometimes artificial; the lawyer's judgment
on what is the best path of conduct in light of the client's goals and
constraints, given the law, will often be easier to reach than the abstract
legal conclusions. But this is, then, a practical conclusion made in light of
the client's legal obligations, not moral obligations.
Although an attractive feature of this view that the lawyer is neither a
moralist nor tactician of self-interest, one might complain that the analysis
overemphasizes the academic or informational role of the lawyer,
characterizing legal advice as the imparting of knowledge of legal
obligations and legal powers. But a second congenial characterization of
the lawyer as counselor is more practical or action-oriented, and similarly
strikes an appealing middle ground between two unfortunate caricatures. It
is tempting to see lawyers as trapped between one paradigm where their job
is to facilitate the client's ability to reach her goals, the pure instrumentalist
account, and another-the prophet or moral seer-in which their job is to
shape the clients' goals and guide her conduct toward what is right. The
Hartian account suggests that the lawyer is there to enable her client to
realize her goals in a manner that stays within the rules. Insofar as it is
facilitating the realization of the client's goals it is somewhat like the
instrumentalist. But it is not entirely instrumental, because the lawyer
speaks to an interest (for lack of a better term) in living up to her legal
obligations, in playing by the rules. And the interest itself is probably not
best characterized in purely instrumental terms, and, indeed, insofar as it
comes from or takes seriously the legal point of view, has a complexion of
normativity built into it.
V. LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL THEORY

Finally, this conception of legal obligations has many implications for
substantive legal theory, which can only be touched upon here.
A. Avoiding Distortions
Ordinary language philosophy of the mid-twentieth century tended to
characterize itself, probably somewhat disingenuously, as having quite
modest aspirations. My favorite version of this modesty is the suggestion
that the point of philosophy is to help thinkers and speakers avoid the
distortions in our ways of speaking and thinking that come from taking
reductive and unnuanced analytical approaches to difficult topics. Hart
very clearly thought of "avoiding distortions" as one of his central tasks as a
legal philosopher. By way of sideways reference, this is my own preferred
reason for thinking that philosophical methodology is helpful in tort theory;
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the common law of tort has been stretched and spun and smashed by
thinkers who were unable to grasp the concepts without remaking them
from their own relatively impoverished theoretical vantage point, thereby
44
greatly distorting the law.

Both sanctions-based views of legal obligations and natural law views of
legal obligation have wrought great havoc on the attempt to understand
various areas of law. Most obviously, Holmes created a mess in tort law
and in contract law by his refusal to take seriously notions of legal right and
legal duty. And he did this because, in part, he could not flesh out a way to
think about legal obligations that was not rooted in a form of natural law
thinking and Blackstonianism that he quite rightly rejected. Common law
theory can restart itself if it finds a way to make room for legal obligations.
Indeed, that is what post-Hartian philosophical theory of common law has,
in significant part, been about. The work of tort law philosophers such as
Stephen Perry, Jules Coleman, John Goldberg, and myself, has not
primarily been-contra that of, for example, George Fletcher or Richard
Epstein-about the fairness-based ideas that stand behind assignments of
liability. It has been about the idea that tort law assigns liability in response
to its judgment that a legal obligation to the plaintiff has been violated.
Notwithstanding some differences in our jurisprudential outlooks, what is in
common is essentially a post-Holmesian, but potentially positivistic
methodology that says it is utterly cogent to think of legal obligations or
duties existing in the common law in a manner that is neither questionbegging nor natural law rooted. This has meant that the efforts to cleanse
tort law of duty-ridden notions and represent it in utterly instrumentalist
fashion were misguided and need not prevail.
Although it is currently unfashionable in Hart scholarship to say so, Hart
also thought it a distortion of legal reality to deny the existence of
international law. It is easy to read from Hart's guarded language in
Chapter X, combined with his warm embrace of the idea earlier in the book
heralding the idea that legal systems should be analyzed as the union of
primary and secondary rules, that Hart did not truly believe international
law qualified as law. But I think this quite clearly is a mistake. The
Concept of Law is very naturally read, in fact, as articulating a rich enough
theory of legal obligation to permit one to retain the idea that international
law is really a form of law. Primary rules exist that purport to impose
obligations, and are recognized from the internal point of view as imposing
obligations. One of the principal advantages of decoupling the notion of
obligation from the existence of a centralized system of sanctions, is that it
permits one to retain the view-widely shared by language and lawyersthat there is such a thing as international law.

44. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson,
146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1733 (1998).
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B. Making Analytical Headway
The category of "making analytical headway" is in some ways the
complement of the "avoiding distortions" category, for one of the problems
with distorting the legal phenomena is that it leads to various artificial
conundrums about law. Thus, for example, Holmes-inspired accounts of
tort law that reject a substantive conception of legal obligations often find it
impossible to explain the tort law's treatment of claims against landowners
by trespassers. The courts have always held that an individual who is
injured on land that the defendant negligently maintained in a dangerous
condition cannot sue the landowner for failure to take care towards her, if
the plaintiff herself was trespassing. The common law rule is based on the
idea that a landowner is not obligated to take reasonable care to make her
land safe for trespassers. Ordinary people, and undoctrinated first-year law
students, find this rule entirely easy to grasp. In a post-Holmesian mindset,
the bar on liability to trespassers becomes a conundrum. To the extent that
a better understanding of legal obligations can make available again a more
intuitive notion of legal obligations, it can clear away analytical problems.
This is not to say that we must keep the trespasser rule, but only that if we
reject it, this cannot be due to its being a basically incoherent idea.
The opportunity for progress can be stated in a more positive way. There
are a variety of new problems, and there are indeed old problems that have
always been theoretically challenging to those who take many different
sorts of views of legal obligations. Understanding legal obligations in the
manner suggested here will not simply return us to an earlier state of
innocence, where all was clear, for there was no such state. It can help us to
push forward by seeing with greater analytical clarity.
C. Modeling Conduct
At one level, Hart's work and that of analytical legal philosophers more
generally is palpably underdeveloped, and even naive, in its approach to the
social scientific project of understanding how legal actors behave. It is
almost entirely armchair theorizing; even if not a priori in the philosophers'
sense, it is certainly not empirical in anybody else's sense. And so it might
seem odd to suppose that a Hartian hermeneutical approach to legal actors
could "help" in any way in answering questions about how legal actors
behave. It simply assumes an answer to this question, as my "defense of
common sense" introduction in effect conceded.
While this is clearly right at some level, it overlooks the incontrovertible
point that many choices in empirical science, including social science, are
choices of methodological framework that are presupposed by whatever
empirical work is being done. This is not to say that such choices are not
sensitive to empirical results, but that the reasons behind the selection of
such methodological approaches are not largely empirical in the way that
empirical legal scholars themselves most value. In short, social scientists of
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legal action need to make essentially theoretical choices in framework, of
course, and the choices they make bear importantly on how the field goes.
One of the (many) reasons that the rational self-interested actor model of
legal actor's conduct has played such a large role in legal scholarship is that
we have been working in a post-Holmesian American legal academy that
assumes that Holmes's critique of legal duties and legal rights was
analytically correct. And another is an equally nonempirical assumption
that something like the "bad man" was a fairly safe way to model legal
actors-not a bad picture of what people are really like. To the degree that
Hart's model of both legal duties and of an "ordinary citizen perspective" is
philosophically defensible, it invites other bases for legal research.
At a second, and in some ways more obvious, level, philosophical
theorizing about the nature of legal obligations and the internal point of
view invites a range of empirical questions: How do most legal actors
regard the law? Do they have a disposition to take the law's existence as a
good reason to behave a certain way? What sort of disincentive or
incentive does the status of "illegality" create, apart from the risk of
sanction? The fact that philosophical models of citizen attitudes could be
significant even without empirical work on the actual nature of ordinary
people's outlooks, does not, of course, take away from the point that such
empirical work would be extremely valuable.
D. Improving the Law
Part of the appeal of positivism, as Jeremy Waldron has emphasized in
his article on Hart's Postscript,45 is its invitation for criticism of the current
law from a moral and political point of view. Although I am not a
positivist, I share with both Hart and Holmes their passion for getting the
dragon out of the cave in order to decide whether to tame him, slay him, or
take some other step.4 6 To the extent that, as argued in Parts V.A and V.B,
above, we need an understanding of the nature of obligations in order to
grasp what the law is, an adequate theory of legal obligations affords us a
greater opportunity to revise the law in light of broader moral and political
values. Similarly, to the extent that we use the law to alter, direct, and
influence conduct, and this conception of legal obligation helps in modeling
conduct, 4 7 again, the provision of an adequate theory of legal obligation
permits greater expertise in evaluating and improving the law.
Finally, notwithstanding the need for empirical work on how various
models of law influence conduct, I am inclined at least to conjecture that
there are many benefits to a legal system that permits citizens to conceive of
their legal obligations as not too discontinuous with their moral obligations,
in at least two respects: (1) Their legal obligations do not, by their very
45. Jeremy Waldron, Normative (or Ethical)Positivism, in Hart's Postscript: Essays on
the Postscript to The Concept ofLaw 411 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
46. Holmes, supra note 4.
47. See supra Part V.C.
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content, conflict with their moral obligations; and (2) many of their most
pressing and general legal obligations are ones they are able to integrate
within an overall conception of how they ought, morally and prudentially,
to conduct themselves. The diminution of such discontinuities would
reduce individual and political conflict, enhance the possibility of
community and solidarity, and diminish the costs of legal education and
enforcement. Of course, there would be many costs as well, and they
might, at the end of the day, outweigh the benefits. The point here is
simply to suggest that yet another implication for legal theory is that the
integration of law, on the one hand, and widely held moral convictions, on
the other, deserves substantial weight in our considerations about which of
our laws to reject, how to revise those we choose to keep, and what sorts of
law ought to be developed.
CONCLUSION

Many students of jurisprudence are more easily engrossed in Dworkin's
defense of the normative structure of legal rights than in Hart's defense of
the notion of legal obligations. And as Dworkin's theory comes packaged
with a preference for courts at work on an anti-majoritarian agenda, while
Hart's does not, it is no surprise that Hart's work on legal obligation is often
treated by nonphilosophical legal academics as a Talmudic or Jesuitical
enterprise of the analytic legal philosopher. Dworkin has played a role in
creating this impression, although the responsibility for this misimpression
probably lies more with Hart himself, who often overplayed his moral,
philosophical, and personal modesty.
Whatever the cause, the failure of legal thinkers and lawyers to embrace
a robust notion of legal obligation is a matter of fundamental importance in
politics, law, lawyering, and legal theory. The years of the Warren Court
undoubtedly pushed jurisprudence scholars to conceive of legal rights in a
richer manner, so that our most powerful governmental institutions could
not fool themselves into tolerating, and even doing, what were essentially
corrupt and illegal activities. Equally, however, the past fifty years, and
increasingly every year, the failure of public and private actors to take their
legal obligations seriously as standards of conduct presents a risk both to
the integrity of our system and to the maintenance of our values.

Notes & Observations

